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NOTICE PLEADING IN EXILE
Adam N. Steinmant
According to the conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court's 2009
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal discarded notice pleading in favor of
plausibility pleading. This Article-part of a symposium commemorating
the Iqbal decision's tenth anniversary-highlights decisions during those
ten years that have continued to endorse notice pleading despite Iqbal. It
also argues that those decisions reflect the best way to read the Iqbal
decision. Although Iqbal is a troubling decision in many respects, it can be
implemented consistently with the notice-pleading framework that the
original drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had in mind.
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INTRODUCTION
Symposia like this one, which recognize the anniversary of a
significant event or Supreme Court decision, often reflect* on the ways
things have changed as a result. This Article's goal, by contrast, is to
highlight how the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqball did not
change things. Or at least, my goal is to show why Iqbal-and its
predecessor, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2-should not be interpreted
to require a restrictive change in the federal pleading standard set forth
in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3
This is not the conventional understanding. Much of the scholarly
attention devoted to Iqbal and Twombly has noted (and typically decried)
the Supreme Court's rejection of the lenient notice-pleading standard
that most of this symposium's contributors learned in law school.41 agree
with the many policy-oriented critiques of restrictive pleading standards
and applaud the virtues of more lenient ones.5 But there is a crucial
antecedent question of what sort of pleading standard Iqbal and Twombly
actually demand.
Among the hundreds of thousands of federal court citations to Iqbal
and Twombly,6 one finds an interesting cadre of judicial opinions where
notice pleading lives. These decisions continue to embrace Conley v.
Gibson's command from more than a half-century ago that "all the Rules
require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
2 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
4 See infra note 37.
5 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 18-23 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Double Play].
6 As of September 2015, Iqbal and Twombly had each been cited in more than 100,000
federal court opinions, making them the third-most (Twombly) and fourth-most (Iqbal)
frequently cited Supreme Court decisions of all time. See Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall
of Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REv. 333, 389-93 (2016) [hereinafter Steinman, Rise and
Fall].
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defendantfair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests."7 They continue to rely on the Court's twenty-first-century
endorsement of notice pleading in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.8 And they
continue to rely on pleading forms from the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-which had been used to "illustrate the simplicity and
brevity that these rules contemplate"9 but were controversially removed
from the text of the Federal Rules in 2015.10 I believe that this band of
exiles is not only righteous, but right. The best way for courts to interpret
and apply the Iqbal decision-as it enters its second decade-is in a way
that preserves notice pleading.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes Rule 8's pleading standard
and the notice-pleading approach that the Supreme Court embraced
during the Federal Rules' first seventy-plus years. Part II describes post-
Iqbal decisions in the lower federal courts that have continued to endorse
notice pleading. Part III addresses the federal pleading forms, which were
included in the initial Federal Rules to provide useful exemplars of notice
pleading but were abrogated in 2015, and identifies federal courts that
have continued to utilize the forms despite Iqbal and despite their post-
Iqbal extraction from the text of the Federal Rules. Part IV examines the
two-step pleading framework that Iqbal articulated and explains how that
framework can-and should-be implemented to save notice pleading.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NOTICE PLEADING
The textual source of the federal pleading standard has remained
essentially unchanged since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted in 1938. Rule 8 instructs that "[a] pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain.., a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief."11 This standard came to be known as
7 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (emphasis added).
s 534 U.S. 506 (2002); see infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (discussing
Swierkiewicz).
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
io See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (discussing the forms and the 2015
amendment).
,, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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"notice pleading,"2 although some resisted that moniker during the
Federal Rules' early years.13 This initial disagreement may have reflected
differing perceptions of what "notice pleading" actually entailed. As
Charles Clark-the chief drafter of the initial Federal Rules-observed:
The usual modern expression, at least of text writers, is to refer
to the notice function of pleadings; notice of the case to the
parties, the court, and the persons interested. This is a sound
approach so far as it goes; but content must still be given to the
word "notice. "14
That insight does prompt a crucial question-both descriptive and
normative-regarding notice pleading: notice of what?I5 The Supreme
Court's engagement with that question began with its landmark 1957
decision in Conley.16 Conley declared that "all the Rules require is a short
and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendantfair notice of
12 See, e.g., James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure,
38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1938) ("The generality of allegation contemplated by the Rules
indicates the influence of the newer concept of 'notice pleading."'); James M. Douglas & Charles
E. Clark, The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 162-63 (1952) (comments
of John W. Willis) (noting that the original Federal Rules advisory committee had "adopt[ed] the
concept of notice pleading"); id. at 160 (noting that Mr. Willis "of the Federal Rules Service,
Washington, D.C.... is an expert who, by virtue of his position in reporting all of the decisions,
has perhaps as complete a picture as anyone can expect"); Irving R. Kaufman, Some Observations
on Pre-Trial Examinations in Federal and State Courts, 12 F.R.D. 363, 365 (1952) (noting that "in
most cases under our federal rules 'the function of the pleadings extends hardly beyond
notification to the opposing parties of the general nature of a party's claim or defense"' and that
"[t]he term 'notice pleading' has been applied to this underlying concept").
13 See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 926 (1953) ("The truth is that the Federal and other modern pleading systems no more
allow 'notice-pleading,' in the sense in which that term has been traditionally used, than does the
Pennsylvania system."); Gunnar H. Nordbye, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 18 F.R.D. 105, 109 (1956) ("Most courts and
textwriters agree that Rule 8 does not countenance mere notice pleading.").
14 Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456,460 (1943) (emphasis added).
is Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1324 (2010) [hereinafter
Steinman, Pleading Problem] ("Judge Clark's observation confirms that a notice-pleading
framework is not inherently a lenient one. It depends on what 'content [is] given to the word
"notice."' (quoting Clark, supra note 14, at 460)); id. at 1340 (proposing an approach to pleading
that "attempt[s] to further refine what 'notice' a defendant is entitled to at the pleadings phase").
16 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."17 This
standard "do [es] not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim."18 The Court also explained that "a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."19
The Supreme Court frequently reaffirmed this understanding
during the Federal Rules' first seven decades, fully embracing the term
"notice pleading."20 In Swierkiewicz2i-an important 2002 decision-the
Court found that a plaintiffs allegation that his "age and national origin
were motivating factors in [the defendant's] decision to terminate his
employment" was sufficient to prevent dismissal of his employment
discrimination claim.22 The Court recognized that Rule 8's "simplified
notice pleading standard"23 might "allow[] lawsuits based on conclusory
allegations of discrimination to go forward."24 As written, however, the
Federal Rules "rel[y] on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims."25 The unanimous Swierkiewicz opinion wrote
that "[t]he liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a
simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the
merits of a claim."26 Imposing a stricter pleading standard, the Court
17 Id. at 47 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
18 Id.
i9 Id. at 45-46.
20 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,511 (2002) (describing the federal approach
as "a notice pleading system"); id. at 512 (describing Conley's "simplified notice pleading
standard"); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993) (noting "the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules"); see
also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 669 (2005) (contrasting the Court's approach to habeas corpus
petitions with "the generous notice-pleading standard for the benefit of ordinary civil plaintiffs
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)"). Even before Conley, the Supreme Court described
the Federal Rules as "restrict[ing] the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving." Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
21 534 U.S. 506.
22 Amended Complaint 137, Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506 (No. 00-1853), 2001 WL 34093952,
at *27a.
23 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
24 Id. at 514.
25 Id. at 512.
26 Id. at 514 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).
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explained, could be done only by "amending the Federal Rules .... not by
judicial interpretation."27
What a difference a decade makes. The 2000s began with
Swierkiewicz's whole-hearted reaffirmance of notice pleading. In 2007,
however, Twombly first articulated the controversial "plausibility"
inquiry,28 ordering the dismissal of an antitrust conspiracy claim against
major telecommunications companies.29 The Twombly majority put into
"retirement"30 some aspects of the Conley decision (although it did not
challenge Conley's "fair notice" standard3l), prompting Justice Stevens to
argue in dissent that the majority's approach was "irreconcilable with
Rule 8 and with our governing precedents."32 And in 2009, Iqbal made
clear that the Twombly approach reflected Rule 8's general pleading
standard,33 applying to all civil cases in federal court and requiring the
dismissal of Mr. Iqbal's claims of intentional discrimination against
27 Id. at 515 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
28 See, e.g., Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ("Because the plaintiffs here
have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must
be dismissed.").
29 Id. at 564 ("When we look for plausibility in this complaint, we agree with the District
Court that plaintiffs' claim of conspiracy in restraint of trade comes up short.").
30 See id. at 561-63 (stating that Conley's observation that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyofid doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" had "earned its
retirement," noting concerns about a "focused and literal reading" of that phrase (quoting Conley,
355 U.S. at 45-46)); see also infra note 108 (discussing this aspect of Conley and Twombly's
handling of it).
31 See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
32 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 572-73 ("Under rules of
procedure that have been well settled... , a judge ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss a
complaint 'must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.' But
instead of requiring knowledgeable executives.., to respond to these allegations by way of sworn
depositions or other limited discovery-and indeed without so much as requiring [defendants]
to file an answer denying that they entered into any agreement-the majority permits immediate
dismissal based on the assurances of company lawyers that nothing untoward was
afoot.... [T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, our longstanding precedent, and sound practice
mandate that the District Court at least require some sort of response from petitioners before
dismissing the case." (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)) (other
internal citation omitted)).
33 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for 'all civil actions,' and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike."
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
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Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller arising
from his treatment by federal officials in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.34
Iqbal also elicited a vigorous dissent, in which Justice Souter-the author
of the Twombly majority opinion-argued that the Iqbal majority
"misapplie[d] the pleading standard under [Twombly],"35 and that Mr.
Iqbal's claim should not have been dismissed because "[t]aking the
complaint as a whole, it gives Ashcroft and Mueller 'fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'36
Following Twombly and Iqbal, much academic commentary
declared the end of notice pleading.37 Numerous federal courts have
continued to embrace it, however. The following Parts of this Article
highlight these decisions and explain why they are implementing the best
reading of Twombly and Iqbal.
34 Id. at 666.
35 Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 698-99 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
37 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems,
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (describing "the Court's choice to replace minimal notice
pleading with a robust gatekeeping regime"); Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking
the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) ("[N]otice pleading
has died."); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 54 (2010)
(arguing that Twombly and Iqbal "have changed the old notice pleading standard to a new
'plausibility' regime"); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286,
346 (2013) ("The Supreme Court has moved the system from a notice pleading structure, which
is what Rule 8 was designed to be, to a fact pleading structure, which is exactly what the Federal
Rules were drafted to reject."); Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of
Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1207 (2014) ("Until Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court
maintained a relatively consistent commitment to Conley's notice pleading rule .... The role of
pleading changed with the Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal."); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 528 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal "rejects
the concept of notice pleading"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431,
431 (2008) ("Notice pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading."); Stephen N. Subrin &
Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1848
(2014) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal "replaced notice pleading with a scheme labeled
plausibility pleading").
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II. NOTICE PLEADING AFTER IQBAL
The most compelling support for the vitality of notice pleading is
hiding in plain sight. The majority opinion in Twombly explicitly
endorsed notice pleading, quoting Conley for the following proposition:
"Rule ... 8(a)(2) requires only [that the complaint] 'give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'38
Just three weeks after the Twombly decision, the Supreme Court's per
curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus39 explicitly cited Twombly's
invocation of Conley's fair-notice standard.40 The Court wrote:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Specific facts are not necessary; the statement
need only "'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests."'41
The Iqbal majority did not purport to do anything more than follow
the approach laid out in Twombly. It cited Twombly exclusively in
describing what is required "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss."42 It then
identified the "[t]wo working principles" that "underlie [its] decision in
Twombly"43 and described how the "decision in Twombly illustrates the
two-pronged approach."44 And in concluding that Mr. Iqbal's complaint
was insufficient, the Iqbal majority stated that it did so "[u]nder
Twombly's construction of Rule 8."45 Accordingly, if providing "fair
notice" was sufficient under Twombly, it should likewise be sufficient
under Iqbal. Or at least, that is the logical implication of the Supreme
Court's own words.
38 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
39 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
40 Id. at 93.
41 Id. at 93 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
42 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (first quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; then
quoting id. at 557; and then quoting id. at 570).
43 Id. at 678.
44 Id. at 679. This "two-pronged approach" is described infra Section IV.A.
45 Id. at 680 ("Under Twombly's construction of Rule 8, we conclude that respondent's
complaint has not 'nudged his claims' of invidious discrimination 'across the line from
conceivable to plausible."' (brackets omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
[Vol. 41:1 0571064
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Indeed, numerous post-Iqbal federal-court decisions have
emphasized Twombly's endorsement of Conley's fair-notice standard. A
unanimous panel decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit wrote-in remarkably short and plain terms46-"Twombly and
Iqbal did not abrogate the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2)."47 A
unanimous Federal Circuit decision stated that "[s]pecific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claim is and the ground upon which it rests."'48
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Khalik v. United Air Lines is also
illustrative.*9 The court of appeals reasoned: "As the Court held in
[Erickson], which it decided a few weeks after Twombly, under Rule 8,
'specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only "give the
defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the ground upon which
it rests.."'50 The court wrote that under the Twombly/Iqbal approach,
"heightened fact pleading" is "expressly rejected;"51 that "[t]here is no
indication the Supreme Court intended a return to the more stringent
pre-Rule 8 pleading requirements;"52 and that "Rule 8(a)(2) still lives."53
The Tenth Circuit also quoted the Supreme Court's observation from
Swierkiewicz that "a requirement of greater specificity for particular
claims is a result that must be obtained by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."54
Another important circuit court examination of Iqbal came from
Judge Diane Wood, who wrote the unanimous Seventh Circuit decision
in Brooks v. Ross.s5 Citing Swierkiewicz, she wrote that Rule 8 "reflects a
46 Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain... a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.").
47 Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010).
48 Disc Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (ellipses in
original) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
49 671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012).
so Id. at 1192 (ellipses in original) (brackets omitted) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
51 Id. at 1191 (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)).
52 Id.
53 Id.
s4 Id. at 1191-92 (brackets omitted) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515
(2002)).
5s 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009).
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liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on
the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep
plaintiffs out of court."56 She also reasoned that the Supreme Court's
Erickson decision "put to rest" the notion that Twombly "had repudiated
the general notice-pleading regime of Rule 8," emphasizing that Erickson
had "reiterated that 'specific facts are not necessary; the statement need
only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests."'57 And finally: "[t]his continues to be the case after
Iqbal."58
One year later, in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,59 Judge Wood authored
another important Seventh Circuit opinion. She reasoned that two core
pre-Twombly principles remained good law after Iqbal. First, "all that is
necessary is that the claim for relief be stated with brevity, conciseness,
and clarity."60 And second, "a basic objective of the rules is to... require
that the pleading discharge the function of giving the opposing party fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the pleader's claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation that is involved."61
The Swanson decision held that Twombly and Iqbal had not
"undermined these broad principles."62 Judge Wood explained:
The [Supreme] Court was not engaged in a sub rosa campaign
to reinstate the old fact-pleading system called for by the Field
Code or even more modern codes. We know that because it said
so in Erickson: "the statement need only give the defendant fair
notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."63
56 Id. at 580 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514).
57 Id. at 581 (ellipses omitted) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)).
58 Id.
59 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010).
6o Id. at 404 (quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1215, at 165-73 (3d ed. 2004)).
61 Id. (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 60, § 1215, at 165-73).
62 Id.
63 Id. (ellipses in original) (brackets added) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007)). Judge Wood also noted "[t]he Supreme Court's explicit decision to reaffirm the validity
of [Swierkiewicz], which was cited with approval in Twombly." Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 41:10571066
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Judge Wood's Swanson decision did elicit a dissent from Judge
Richard Posner.64 But Judge Wood had the votes.65 Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit's Swanson decision prompted an Indiana district court judge to
declare that "notice pleading remains the law of the land."66
In highlighting these examples, I do not mean to dispute that there
are also numerous lower court decisions that cast doubt on the viability
of notice pleading in the wake of Iqbal.67 And empirical studies have
reported the impact of Iqbal on both judicial decisions and litigant
behavior.68 It is important, however, to shine a light on federal court
decisions that have continued to apply a notice-pleading standard.
See id. at 407 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("I join the majority opinion except with respect to
reversing the dismissal of the plaintiffs claim of housing discrimination. I have difficulty
squaring that reversal with Ashcroft v. Iqbal.").
65 See In re Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A panel decision is binding on
another court panel unless overruled with the approval of the en banc court."); see also United
States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2016) ("Although I agree with Judge Colloton's
dissent in United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2015), our panel is bound by
the contrary decision of the panel majority in Taylor." (Loken, J., concurring)); United States v.
Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1364 (4th Cir. 1993) ("It should not need to be remarked that it is the
opinion of the panel majority that binds and governs district courts within this circuit."); cf.
Christopher Jackson, Daveed Diggs, Lin-Manuel Miranda & Okieriete Onaodowan, Atlantic
Records, Cabinet Battle #1, YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
dSYW61XQZeo [https://perma.cc/2X9Z-BQYL] ("You don't have the votes.").
66 A.B. ex rel. Kehoe v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, No. 3:11 CV 163 PPS, 2011 WL 4005987, at
*4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 8,2011) (citing Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,404 (7th Cir. 2010));
see also EEOC v. Scrub, Inc., No. 09 C 4228, 2009 WL 3458530, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009)
("Iqbal and Twombly did not repudiate general notice-pleading." (citing Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d
574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009))).
67 See, e.g., Marcus v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 661 F. App'x 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
(contrasting "the relaxed 'notice pleading' standards applied by New York state courts" with "the
more demanding plausibility standard established by the Supreme Court in [Twombly] and
[Iqbal]"); Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. All Bros. Painting, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-934-ORL-22DAB,
2013 WL 5921538, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013) ("In [Twombly] and [Iqbal], the Supreme Court
enunciated a new, heightened pleading standard, abrogating the notice pleading standard stated
in [Conley]."); see also Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2012)
("It is true that [Twombly and Iqbal] require more specificity from complaints in federal civil
cases than was heretofore the case."); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
2009) (discussing "[t]he demise of Swierkiewicz"). But cf. Steinman, Pleading Problem, supra note
15, at 1345 & n.300 (noting that the Third Circuit in Fowler "squarely rejected the idea that a
complaint must somehow suggest the truth or provability of the allegations contained therein").
68 See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman, Zoran Obradovic & Kosta Ristovski,
Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J.
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III. THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE ABROGATED PLEADING FORMS
In addition to explicitly endorsing the continued validity of notice
pleading after Iqbal, numerous federal courts have continued to embrace
the pleading forms that illustrated the drafters' initial vision. These forms
were part and parcel of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure both at their
inception and when the Supreme Court decided Twombly and Iqbal. As
Rule 84 instructed, the forms "suffice under these rules and illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate."69 One oft-cited
example was Form 11, which provided that the following negligence
allegation was sufficient under Rule 8: "On date, at place, the defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff."70 Form 11 did not
require a plaintiff to allege in the complaint precisely why the defendant's
driving was negligent, or what evidence it would use to prove negligence.71
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (2013); Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery?
Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2306-07
(2012); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial
Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Alexander A. Reinert,
Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REv. 2117, 2145 (2015).
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11, 5 2 (2014) (abrogated 2015), reprinted in Steinman, Rise and Fall,
supra note 6, at 395. Prior to 2007, the form negligence complaint was depicted in Form 9; the
pre-2007 sample allegation was, "On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in
Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was
then crossing said highway." Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9 (2007) (abrogated 2015)); see also Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 n.4 (2002) (same).
71 Another example from the Federal Rules' pleading forms was Form 18's complaint for
patent infringement. Using a patent for electric motors as an example, Form 18 deemed it
sufficient to allege: "The defendant has infringed and is still infringing the Letters Patent by
making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented invention ... " FED. R. CIV.
P. Form 18, 5 3 (2014) (abrogated 2015). Form 18 did not require allegations regarding how the
defendant's motors embodied the plaintiff's patented invention.
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Form 11 was a paradigm of notice pleading.72 In Charles Clark's
view, those forms were "the most important part of the rules."73
Discussing Rule 8's pleading standard, he wrote: "We do not require
detail. We require a general statement. How much? Well, the answer is
made in what I think is probably the most important part of the rules so
far as this particular topic is concerned, namely, the Forms."74
In 2015, however, Rule 84 and the accompanying pleading forms
were abrogated.75 That the forms have been removed from the current
text of the Federal Rules, however, does not make them irrelevant.
According to the advisory committee note that accompanied the 2015
amendment, the purpose of the abrogation was that the forms "are no
longer necessary" because "[t] he purpose of providing illustrations for the
rules, although useful when the rules were adopted, has been fulfilled."76
It logically follows-and the advisory committee explicitly clarified-that
the removal of the forms "does not alter existing pleading standards or
otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule 8."77
Given the stated rationale of the 2015 amendment, it would be a
mistake to read the pleading forms that existed for nearly eighty years as
no longer relevant.78 Indeed, even in the wake of Twombly, Iqbal, and the
2015 amendments, federal courts have continued to rely on now-
72 See Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84,
and the Forms, 15 NEV. L.J. 1093, 1106-07 (2015) ("As Charles Clark stated, the forms were
intended to give meaning to the rules.... Because of Rule 84, Rule 8 and Form 11 are one and
the same."); Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015
Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 40 (2016) [hereinafter Steinman, End of an Era] (noting the
"iconic pleading forms, which had long stood as exemplars of the lenient approach to pleading
that the drafters of the original rules envisioned"); see also Miller, Double Play, supra note 5, at
40 (calling Form 11 "the paradigm negligence complaint").
73 Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958).
74 Id.
75 See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. See generally
Steinman, End of an Era, supra note 72, at 22, 27 (summarizing the elimination of the pleading
forms and the accompanying advisory committee note).
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
7 Id.
78 See Steinman, End of an Era, supra note 72, at 40-42; see also Catherine T. Struve, Phantom
Rules, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 70, 86 (2017) ("Given the Committee Note's explicit statement
that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading requirement is unaltered by Rule 84's abrogation, and given the
weight that some pre-2015 case law had accorded to the forms, claimants are likely to urge that
courts continue to rely upon the forms when assessing a pleading's sufficiency.").
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abrogated forms such as Form 11. One district court, in finding that a
claim for negligent medical treatment was sufficiently pled,79 stated that
it "[drew] comfort from the fact that the old forms attached to the back
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not require much for
negligence claims."80 It added that "[n]o one has suggested that the
Supreme Court abrogated the forms-including Form 1 1-in Iqbal and
Twombly."81
Another district court has written that the forms-including Form
11-reflected "simple, intuitive claims that could be pled with little detail
while still putting defendants on notice of the alleged conduct of which
they were accused."82 The court wrote that Twombly and Iqbal "seem not
to cast doubt on this role. Indeed, the Court in Twombly took pains to say
that their decision was not meant to raise pleading standards."83 Nor did
the 2015 amendments undermine the relevance of the forms: "The
abrogation of Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms eliminated the most
obvious landmarks for this line of thought, but it did not eliminate the
rationale itself"84
As with the previous Part's discussion, this sample of decisions is not
meant to be exhaustive.85 And there are certainly cases that take the
79 Begay v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1089 (D.N.M. 2016).
8o Id. at 1089 n.47 (citing and quoting FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (2014) (abrogated 2015)).
81 Id.
82 John Keeler & Co. v. Heron Point Seafood, Inc., No. 1:14 CV 1652, 2017 WL 3705863, at
*9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2017) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
83 Id.
84 Id. at *10 (emphasis added); see also Whitcraft v. Scaturo, No. 5:16-2385-]FA, 2017 WL
371037, at *2 n.4 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2017) (stating that, in adopting a Magistrate Judge's report and
recommendation, the district court had "removed Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 and App. Form 11 from its
consideration as these were abrogated in 2015" but noting that "this abrogation occurred because
Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms were no longer necessary and the abrogation of Rule 84 does
not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule 8" and
that therefore "the Magistrate Judge's analysis remains correct" (citations and internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)).
85 Other examples of post-2015 decisions that rely on the abrogated pleading forms include
Torres v. Inteliquent, Inc., No. 17-10022, 2018 WL 5809246, at *6 & n.37 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2018)
(citing and quoting Form 11 to support the proposition that, at the pleading phase, federal courts
accept "the factual allegation that a defendant was negligent"); Rosado-Acha v. Rosado, No. 17-
1031 (SEC), 2018 WL 1444202, at *8 (D.P.R. Mar. 19, 2018) ("[A] complaint modeled on Form
11 of the Appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which contains sufficient facts to make
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opposite position-that the abrogated forms are no longer relevant to the
federal pleading standards.86 For the reasons discussed above, however,
there is a straightforward argument that the abrogation of the forms
should not be read to make a substantive change in the pleading standard
in light of the clear advisory committee note accompanying the 2015
amendment.87 And because those forms illustrated the sort of notice-
pleading approach that was envisioned by the Federal Rules' original
drafters and implemented by the Supreme Court during the Rules' first
seven decades, the reliance on those forms by some lower federal courts
reflects a continued embrace of notice pleading.88
IV. How IQBAL CAN PRESERVE NOTICE PLEADING
This Part argues that federal courts that have continued to embrace
notice pleading after Iqbal are doing exactly what they should be doing.
Section A takes a close look at the two-step framework that Iqbal
articulated. Section B explains how that two-step approach can be
implemented in a way that preserves notice pleading. And Section C
argues that Supreme Court's post-Iqbal decision in Johnson v. City of
the claim plausible is ordinarily enough to surpass the standard prescribed under Twombly-
Iqbal.").
86 See, e.g., Robern, Inc. v. Glasscrafters, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1007 n.3 (D.N.J. 2016)
("Plaintiff incongruously argues that while Rule 84 and Form 18 have been abrogated, the
pleading standards... have not changed.").
87 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
a8 Some federal courts took the view that the pleading forms were fundamentally in conflict
with the pleading standard reflected by Twombly and Iqbal, and therefore viewed particular
forms as creating "exceptions" from Twombly and lqbal for particular claims. See, e.g., Tannerite
Sports, LLC v. Jerent Enters., LLC, No. 6:15-cv-00180-AA, 2016 WL 1737740, at *10 (D. Or. May
2, 2016) (describing Form 18's "patent infringement exception to the civil pleading requirements
set forth in Twombly and Iqbal"). Following the 2015 abrogation of the forms, therefore, some
courts viewed the advisory committee note's reference to "existing pleading standards" as
imposing the Twombly/Iqbal approach to claims that had previously been subject to a more
lenient, form-based standard. See Webasto Thermo & Comfort N. Am., Inc. v. BesTop, Inc., No.
16-cv-13456, 2017 WL 4535290, at *11-12 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2017). The better
understanding-as elaborated in Part IV of this Article-is that what was sufficient before
Twombly and Iqbal (notice pleading, as reflected by the pleading forms) is still sufficient today.
Properly understood, Twombly and Iqbal do not mandate a stricter approach to pleading, and
neither does the abrogation of the pleading forms.
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Shelby reflects precisely such an approach to federal pleading standards
after Iqbal.
A. Understanding Iqbal's Two Steps
Although it may seem surprising to argue that Iqbal preserves notice
pleading, that is the best reading of the two-step framework that the Iqbal
majority endorsed. The first step, according to Iqbal, is to identify
allegations that are mere "legal conclusions" and disregard them for
purposes of determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief.89
The Iqbal majority provided little guidance regarding why the crucial
allegations in the Iqbal complaint qualified as unacceptably conclusory,
except to emphasize that a complaint requires "more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,"90 or "a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action."91 Although the lack of
meaningful guidance on this issue is a frustrating aspect of the Court's
reasoning in Iqbal,92 this shortcoming permits an elegant way to reconcile
Iqbal with notice pleading. An allegation qualifies as conclusory-as a
mere legal conclusion-when it fails to provide "fair notice of what the
plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."93
What about Iqbal's second step, the infamous "plausibility" inquiry?
Although Iqbal's plausibility requirement has garnered the lion's share of
scholarly criticism, its role in Iqbal's doctrinal framework is often
misunderstood. Most crucially, when a court assesses a complaint's
"plausibility," it must accept as true all of the nonconclusory allegations:
"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
89 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").
go Id. at 678.
91 Id. (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
92 See Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 358 ("[T]he Twornbly and Iqbal decisions
themselves fail to provide concrete guidance on what makes an allegation impermissibly
conclusory."').
93 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 352
n.113 (arguing that "one might perfectly align Twombly and Iqbal with notice pleading" by
"defining the term 'conclusory' to mean 'failing to provide fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests."' (emphasis omitted)).
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their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief."94
According to the Supreme Court's own words, an allegation can
never be disregarded because it is not plausible. It can be disregarded only
because it is conclusory.95 To allow courts to second-guess a
nonconclusory allegation under the guise of "plausibility" would
contravene the requirement that nonconclusory allegations must be
accepted as true at the pleading phase. Accordingly, if all substantive
requirements of a meritorious claim are covered by nonconclusory
allegations, then the complaint has more than just "plausibly give[n] rise
to an entitlement to relief."96 It has confirmed an entitlement to relief-at
least at the pleading phase.97
Surprisingly, then, the plausibility step in the Iqbal test makes it
more forgiving than it would otherwise be. It permits a complaint "to pass
muster even if a substantive requirement of the plaintiffs claim is stated
only in conclusory terms."98 Without the plausibility inquiry a
complaint's failure to provide nonconclusory allegations for every
element for a meritorious claim would be fatal. Under Iqbals first-step,
conclusory allegations are not entitled to the presumption of truth, so a
complaint that addresses a key element only with a conclusory allegation
would not pass muster. The plausibility inquiry-on the Court's own
terms-leaves open the possibility that a complaint that fails to provide
nonconclusory allegations for every substantive requirement of a
meritorious claim might, nonetheless, "plausibly suggest an entitlement
to relief."99
94 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added); see also Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at
352 ("To allow courts to second-guess uch allegations under the guise of 'plausibility' would
contravene the requirement that nonconclusory allegations must be accepted as true at the
pleading phase.").
95 See supra text accompanying note 94.
96 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
97 Steinman, Pleading Problem, supra note 15, at 1316-17.
98 Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 351 (emphasis added).
99 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added); see also Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at
355 ("As a logical matter, the potential for the plausibility inquiry to salvage complaints where
the requirements of a meritorious claim are addressed only by conclusory allegations makes the
pleading framework more forgiving, not less.").
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Properly understood, the plausibility inquiry would also help to
coherently situate aspects of the federal pleading standard that were not
squarely incorporated into pre-Twombly case law. For example, although
this Article embraces a continuing role for Conley's fair-notice standard,
Conley's actual articulation of that standard was not entirely complete.
Recall Conley's statement that "all the Rules require is 'a short and plain
statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."too Standing alone,
this language does not incorporate the possibility of a pure legal-
sufficiency challenge. It is not necessarily sufficient merely to provide "a
short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."o1 Such a claim-even if it is stated with "unquestionable
clarity"12-should nonetheless be dismissed if that claim would fail as a
matter of law.103 The plausibility inquiry explicitly folds legal sufficiency
into the overarching pleading standard. When a complaint fails to state a
viable legal claim-even if all allegations are accepted as true-it does not
"state[] a plausible claim for relief."104
i00 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see also Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair
notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' (ellipses in original)
(quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
ioi Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102 Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 355.
103 Id. (noting that "legal-sufficiency inquiries ... have long been an accepted aspect of notice
pleading"); see also id. at 342 ("Even at the pleading stage, a defendant could challenge a claim's
legal sufficiency. If the substantive law does not provide a remedy for the conduct alleged, the
complaint's statement of the claim does not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required
by Rule 8(a)(2). And such a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
which justifies dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)." (footnotes, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted)).
lO Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss."). The same could be said about a complaint in which "the plaintiff has 'pled
itself out of court' by including allegations that conclusively undermine a viable claim."
Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 355; see also id. at 342-43 & nn.45-46 (citing cases
supporting the idea that dismissal is warranted at the pleading phase). That is, the plaintiffs own
allegations would reveal no "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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B. The Key Issue: What Is (and Is Not) Conclusory?
Once the plausibility inquiry is properly situated and understood,
the crucial question becomes how to assess which allegations qualify as
conclusory. As discussed above, Iqbal permits courts to deny the
presumption of truth only to conclusory allegations-not allegations that
lack plausibility.105 One way to reconcile notice pleading with Iqbal is with
what can be called a transactional approach. What makes an allegation
conclusory is its failure to ground the allegation in some real-world event
or transaction:
Suppose, for example, that a complaint alleges merely: "the
defendant violated the plaintiffs legal rights in a way that
entitles the plaintiff to relief'; or "the defendant violated the
plaintiffs rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"; or
"the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff under state
law and this breach proximately caused damages to the
plaintiff."106
Allegations like this should not be sufficient standing alone to avoid
a pleading-stage dismissal-even under a notice-pleading regime. They
quite obviously fail to provide "fair notice of what the [plaintiffs] claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests."107 And they can quite sensibly be
called "conclusory" for purposes of Iqbal's pleading framework.08
io See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
io6 Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 353.
107 Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration added) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
lo8 These hypothetical allegations also reveal why notice pleading is not undermined by
Twombly's decision to "retire[]" Conley's statement that "a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (quoting
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46); see supra note 30. Twombly's concern was an overly "focused and
literal reading" of that phrase that would prevent dismissal "whenever the pleadings left open the
possibility that a plaintiffmight later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). Indeed, a bare allegation
"the defendant violated the plaintiffs legal rights in a way that entitles the plaintiff to relief'
would not show that there is "no set of facts" that would support a viable claim. Accordingly, to
follow such a "focused and literal reading" of that language from Conley would deem such an
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What makes these allegations problematic is that they are not
tethered to concrete events-"they fail to provide an adequate
transactional narrative."109 The now-abrogated Form 11, by contrast,
identified the conduct and event that gave rise to the plaintiffs claim: "On
date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the
plaintiff."110 If that allegation is ultimately proven true, the defendant
would be liable as a matter of substantive law. The allegation in Form 1 1
may not describe precisely how the defendant's driving was negligent, but
this is not what "fair notice" requires-at least not at the pleading stage.
Nor should such an allegation be deemed "conclusory" under Iqbal.
The same is true for the employment-discrimination complaint that
was at issue in the Swierkiewicz case. The plaintiff alleged the various
positions he held at the company,1", his age (fifty-three),112 his nationality
(Hungarian),113 and that "Plaintiffs age and national origin were
motivating factors in [defendant's] decision to terminate his
employment."114 If those allegations are proven true, the defendant would
be liable as a matter of substantive law. Although this allegation did not
specify how the plaintiff intended to prove that discriminatory intent
motivated his firing, it made clear the transactions giving rise to his claim.
Such allegations are sufficient to provide "fair notice" and, likewise, they
should not be disregarded as "conclusory" under Iqbal.
What about the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal? To be clear, it
would be entirely reasonable to conclude-contrary to the Twombly and
Iqbal majorities-that the key allegations in those cases had provided a
allegation sufficient-even though it clearly fails to provide "fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; see also Steinman, Rise and
Fall, supra note 6, at 353-57 (noting that a complaint that "alleged nothing more than 'the planet
Earth is round"' could not be dismissed under Twombly's "nonsensically literal understanding of
[Conley's 'no set of facts'] phrase"). It would be quite perverse, therefore, to read Twombly's
rejection of Conley's "no set of facts" language as also rejecting Conley's fair-notice standard-
especially when that same Twombly decision endorses Conley's fair-notice standard. See supra
notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
109 Steinman, Pleading Problem, supra note 15, at 1334.
us FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11, 2 (2014) (abrogated 2015), reprinted in Steinman, Rise and Fall,
supra note 6, at 395.
iii See Amended Complaint, supra note 22, 5 17, 19.
112 See id. 5 13.
113 See id. 5 12.
114 See id. 5 37.
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sufficient transactional narrative that they should have been accepted as
true; and if they had been accepted as true, those complaints should not
have been dismissed.115 There are, however, some ways in which those
allegations are distinct from the exemplars of notice pleading-or at least
they were perceived as such by the Supreme Court.
In Twombly-where the key issue was whether the defendants had
agreed or conspired with one another-the majority insisted that the
complaint had made no "independent allegation of actual agreement."16
That is, the problem was not the failure to allege evidence to support he
position that an agreement occurred; it was the failure to make a concrete
allegation of any such agreement-rather than simply assuming that
anticompetitive parallel conduct itself constituted an actionable
conspiracy.117 And in Iqbal, one might read the complaint as failing to
identify what independent actions by Ashcroft and Mueller were
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.11 On this view, Iqbal does not
indicate that every allegation of discriminatory intent is inherently
conclusory-that would be impossible to square with Swierkiewicz.
Rather, the complaint must adequately identify the liability-generating
transactions that were tainted with such animus.119
15 See Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 366 n.181 ("To accept the approach to pleading
urged here, one need not necessarily agree with the Supreme Court's findings that the core
allegations in the Twombly and Iqbal complaints should indeed have been disregarded as
conclusory. Although there are some ways in which those allegations are less-than-ideal from a
transactional standpoint, one could sensibly conclude otherwise." (citations omitted)).
116 Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (emphasis added).
117 This may have been because the phrasing of the relevant paragraph in the complaint
indicated that "the conspiracy derives from the [anticompetitive] parallel conduct" rather than
that an agreement was reached to engage in the anticompetitive conduct. Steinman, Rise and Fall,
supra note 6, at 360. Although I disagree that this is how the Twombly majority should have
understood the Twombly complaint, id. at 361 n.160, that understanding was the premise of the
majority's reasoning-and the majority suggested that an "independent allegation of actual
agreement" would have been sufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
118 See Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 362.
119 See id. at 362-63. This understanding also gives effect to Rule 9(b)'s instruction that
"[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally."
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Although the allegation regarding intent may be alleged generally, it must be
sufficiently tethered to an adequately identified, liability-generating event or transaction to avoid
being deemed conclusory. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 ("Rule 8 does not empower
respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label 'general allegation,'
and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.").
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I have elaborated on these potential distinctions in greater detail
elsewhere.120 And I am sympathetic to the view that the Twombly and
Iqbal majorities had misinterpreted the key allegations in the complaints
in order to justify the results they reached in those cases.121 The key point
here, however, is that it is possible to reconcile the reasoning and results
of Twombly and Iqbal with notice pleading.122 Couple this with
Twombly's (and Erickson's) explicit embrace of Conley's fair-notice
standard,123 and one can see why the post-Iqbal decisions discussed
earlier in this Article have it right: notice pleading lives. Or at least, notice
pleading lives under the best reading of Twombly and Iqbal.124
C. A Hint from the Supreme Court? Johnson v. City of Shelby
The Supreme Court itself hinted at the continued vitality of notice
pleading in a 2014 per curiam decision: Johnson v. City of Shelby.125 The
primary issue in Johnson was whether a plaintiffs failure to explicitly
invoke a particular statutory cause of action-42 U.S.C. § 1983-in a
complaint alleging due process violations required dismissal at the
pleading stage.126 As to that question, the Supreme Court held that the
120 See Steinman, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 360-63; Steinman, Pleading Problem, supra
note 15, at 1336-39.
121 See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697-99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reading
of the Iqbal complaint); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 589-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's reading of the Twombly complaint).
122 As a matter of case-law interpretation, it is not clear whether fidelity to stare decisis should
require reconciling the bare results of cases, such as the Twombly and Iqbal majorities' ultimate
findings that the allegations in those complaints were conclusory. See Adam N. Steinman, To Say
What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737,
1742 (2013); see also id. at 1783-86 (arguing that stare decisis should not require courts to justify,
reconcile, or explain the bare results reached by superior courts, as distinct from the principles
articulated in reaching those results).
123 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
124 The corollary to this is: courts that read Twombly and Iqbal to impose a stricter standard
than notice pleading are not following the best reading of those cases. See Steinman, Rise and
Fall, supra note 6, at 366-67 ("[A] careful reading of Twombly and Iqbal not only permits, but
compels them to be applied in a manner that preserves the preexisting notice-pleading
framework.").
125 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
126 Id. at 11.
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Johnson plaintiffs' failure to cite § 1983 was not fatal.127 More significantly
for this Article's focus, the Supreme Court went on to explain why the
plaintiffs' complaint in Johnson complied with the federal pleading
standard under Iqbal.128
Johnson recognized that Twombly and Iqbal require a plaintiff to
"plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility,"
but the Court found that the complaint in Johnson was "not deficient in
that regard."129 Why? Because the plaintiffs had "stated simply, concisely,
and directly events that, they alleged, entitled them to damages from the
city."130 As the Court put it: "Having informed the city of the factual basis
for their complaint, they were required to do no more to stave off
threshold dismissal for want of an adequate statement of their claim."131
The Supreme Court's Johnson decision confirms that a "simpl[e],"
"concise[]," and "direct[]" statement of the underlying "events"
constitutes a sufficient "factual basis" under Iqbal.132 And a plaintiff is
"required to do no more to stave off threshold dismissal for want of an
adequate statement of their claim."133 This reasoning fits quite well with
the transactional understanding of notice pleading set out above. Indeed,
the Johnson plaintiffs' substantive basis for their due process claim was
"that they were fired by the city's board of aldermen, not for deficient
performance, but because they brought to light criminal activities of one
of the aldermen."34 Like the claims in Iqbal and Swierkiewicz, the Johnson
plaintiffs' claim depended on the defendants' state of mind. The Johnson
decision bolsters the view that an allegation that a defendant had a certain
state of mind (say, discriminatory intent) is not inherently conclusory. As
discussed above, such an allegation should be accepted as true-including
127 Id. at 11 (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not countenance dismissal
of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted").
128 Id. at 12 ("Our decisions in [Twombly] and [Iqball ... concern the factual allegations a
complaint must contain to survive a motion to dismiss .... Petitioners' complaint was not
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its description of the defendant's state of mind-as long as it adequately
identifies the liability-generating events or transactions.
CONCLUSION
Iqbal is a troubling decision in many respects. But whether Iqbal
means the end of notice pleading is a matter of choice, not command. The
federal court decisions that have chosen to read Iqbal to preserve notice
pleading are right-not only as a matter of procedural policy, but as a
matter of case-law interpretation.
